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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Reinaldo Berrios, Felix Cruz, Troy Moore, and Angel 
Rodriguez (together, ―the defendants‖) appeal from 
judgments of conviction and sentence in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of the Virgin Islands arising out of a 
series of carjackings, an attempted robbery, and the murder of 
a security guard.  Between them, the defendants have raised a 
number of arguments on appeal, including evidentiary errors, 
prosecutorial misconduct, faulty jury instructions, sufficiency 
of the evidence, and double jeopardy.  We address the various 
contentions in turn, but focus our discussion on two principal 
issues:  clarifying our jurisprudence under the Confrontation 
Clause and its relationship to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
and resolving a question of statutory interpretation under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j) with double jeopardy implications.  
After thorough consideration of the arguments presented by 
both sides, we will affirm. 
 5 
I. 
A.  Factual History 
 On April 17, 2004, at 9:45 p.m., Lydia Caines was 
speaking on her cell phone in her car, a tan Chevy Cavalier, 
when a masked man exited a white Suzuki Sidekick with 
tinted windows and stuck a gun against the car‘s window.  
Caines dropped her phone and relinquished her vehicle, and 
both her car and the Sidekick were driven away.  Law 
enforcement learned that the Sidekick was owned by 
Reinaldo Berrios, who had been seen driving it earlier in the 
evening when he was ticketed by a traffic cop and later in the 
evening when he spoke to a police officer.  On April 18, 
Caines‘s phone was used to make calls to the family of Angel 
Rodriguez and to a friend of Troy Moore. 
 An hour later, three masked gunmen attempted to rob a 
Wendy‘s Restaurant, which Berrios had discussed with a 
friend earlier that day.  An off-duty police officer, Cuthbert 
Chapman, was working as a security guard for the Wendy‘s at 
the time; when he attempted to stop the robbery, the would-be 
robbers shot him repeatedly, and he died nine days later from 
his wounds.  Before leaving, one of the robbers yelled, ―Troy, 
let we go,‖ meaning, ―Troy, let‘s go.‖  After the shooting, the 
robbers fled; two of them got into a champagne-colored 
Chevy Cavalier, which was being driven by an individual 
who had not entered the Wendy‘s.  The Cavalier crashed, 
severely damaging one of the wheels, and the occupants 
abandoned it.  When it was recovered, law enforcement 
determined that it was the stolen Cavalier, although the 
license plate had been switched and a side-view mirror was 
 6 
missing.  A mask, similar to the ones worn by the robbers, 
was found close to the vehicle.  Threads found in the Chevy 
Cavalier were matched to the material of a jacket retrieved 
from Felix Cruz‘s room, and a fingerprint from Rodriguez 
was lifted off of the license plate. 
 Around 11:00 p.m., shortly after the Wendy‘s robbery 
and shooting, Shariska Peterson was confronted by three 
masked men as she was walking to her Honda Accord.  As 
the men demanded the keys to her car, one of them pointed a 
gun at her head.  Instead, Peterson threw them into the high 
grass in her yard, prompting one of the men to say, ―You 
should not have done that,‖ and then the three ran away.  
Peterson saw a fourth man join them as they left.  Soon 
thereafter, four masked men stole Rita Division‘s Toyota 
Echo, which she had left running while she was locking up 
the gate at the high school where she worked.  One of the 
men ordered her at gunpoint to stay away from the car.  Her 
car was recovered a few days later; the original license plate 
for Caines‘s Chevy Cavalier and its missing side-view mirror 
were found nearby. 
 In July of 2004, a federal judge in the District Court of 
Puerto Rico approved a Title III surveillance application, 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq., to monitor 
conversations in a detention center in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, 
as part of an unrelated investigation into criminal activity in 
which Berrios and Moore were involved (the ―Title III 
recording‖); both Berrios and Moore were in the detention 
center at the time.  Surveillance was performed both through 
video and sound recording.  Authorities intercepted a 
conversation between Berrios and Moore in a recreational 
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yard at the detention facility during which they discussed, in 
detail, the Wendy‘s shooting and getaway, and their 
respective roles in it.  The defendants identified Rodriguez 
(by nickname) as the getaway driver, and blamed him for 
blowing out a tire and crashing the getaway car.  During the 
conversation, Moore also threatened to kill an individual who 
worked at a store with his girlfriend and was getting 
―regularly question[ed]‖ by the police. 
B.  Trial and Procedural History 
 On May 31, 2006, a federal grand jury in the District 
of the Virgin Islands returned a third superseding indictment 
charging each defendant with conspiracy and attempt to 
interfere with commerce by robbery, both in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Counts 1 and 2, respectively); carjacking 
and attempted carjacking, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2919(1) (Counts 3 and 10, and Count 8, respectively); using 
a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Counts 4, 9 and 11); 
causing the death of a person through use of a firearm, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) (Count 6); first-degree 
felony murder, in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 922(a)(2) and 11 
(Count 5); and unauthorized use of a firearm, in violation of 
14 V.I.C. §§ 2253(a) and 11 (Count 7).  On February 6, 2007, 
after a four-week trial, the jury found the defendants guilty on 
all charges.  On July 8, the District Court entered judgments 
of acquittal on Counts Three (carjacking) and Four (use of a 
firearm during the carjacking) for the Caines incident, as to 
Moore, Rodriguez and Cruz, but otherwise denied 
defendants‘ motions for judgments of acquittal and a new 
trial. 
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 Berrios was sentenced to life imprisonment and 
consecutive prison terms totaling 70 years on the federal 
counts, and to life imprisonment and a consecutive prison 
term of 15 years on the Virgin Islands counts, with local 
sentences to run consecutively to the federal sentences.  
Rodriguez, Cruz and Moore were sentenced to life 
imprisonment on the federal counts, and to life imprisonment 
and a consecutive 15-year prison term on the Virgin Islands 
counts, with local sentences to run consecutively to federal 
sentences.  Each defendant was fined $50,000 for Count 7.  
The defendants filed timely notices of appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 48 
U.S.C. § 1612(a) and (c).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
III. 
 The defendants raise six categories of error, which we 
address in turn: 
A.  Title III Evidence 
B.  Rule 404(b) Evidence 
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
D.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
E.  Jury Instructions 
 9 
F.  Double Jeopardy 
After careful review, we find that none of the arguments 
raised by the defendants has merit. 
A.  Title III Evidence 
 The Title III recording of the conversation between 
Berrios and Moore formed the cornerstone of the 
prosecution‘s case against Rodriguez, Cruz, and Moore, and 
these three defendants challenge admission of the recording 
on several grounds.  Rodriguez and Cruz challenge the 
recording as a violation of their rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and in the 
alternative, as inadmissible hearsay under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.  Moore contends that the Title III application 
was facially deficient, and therefore the recording should 
have been suppressed.  Due to the confusion exhibited by the 
parties as to the proper scope of the Confrontation Clause, we 
will first clarify our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence with 
regards to testimonial versus nontestimonial statements, 
before proceeding to the admissibility of the recording against 
the three defendants.  We exercise ―plenary review over 
Confrontation Clause challenges,‖ United States v. Lore, 430 
F.3d 190, 208 (3d Cir. 2005), but review a nonconstitutional 
challenge to the admission of hearsay for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 337 (3d Cir. 2010). 
1.  Confrontation Clause Challenges 
 The Sixth Amendment‘s Confrontation Clause 
provides that ―[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
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enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.‖  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  Until recently, the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause had been governed by the ―indicia of 
reliability‖ test laid out by Justice Blackmun in Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).  Under Roberts, an 
absent witness‘s hearsay statement could be introduced 
against a criminal defendant only if the witness was 
unavailable at trial and the statement bore certain ―indicia of 
reliability,‖ either by ―fall[ing] within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception‖ or by showing ―particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.‖  Id. at 66.  In Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 51 (2004), however, the Supreme Court observed 
that, at its core, the Confrontation Clause is concerned with 
―testimonial‖ hearsay.  Abrogating Roberts, the Crawford 
Court adopted a per se rule that where testimonial hearsay is 
concerned and the declarant is absent from trial, the 
Confrontation Clause requires that the witness be unavailable 
and that the defendant have had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.  Id. at 59, 68. 
 In subsequent decisions, the Court overruled Roberts 
in its entirety, holding without qualification that the 
Confrontation Clause protects the defendant only against the 
introduction of testimonial hearsay statements, and that 
admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay is governed solely by 
the rules of evidence.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813, 823-24 (2006) (holding that, under Crawford, the 
Confrontation Clause protects only against admission of 
testimonial hearsay, because ―a limitation so clearly reflected 
in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be said 
to mark out not merely its ‗core,‘ but its perimeter‖); 
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Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1152-53 (2011) 
(confirming that Crawford limits the reach of the 
Confrontation Clause to testimonial statements); Whorton v. 
Bocking, 549 U.S. 406, 419-20 (2007) (―Under Crawford, . . . 
the Confrontation Clause has no application to [out-of-court 
nontestimonial statements] and therefore permits their 
admission even if they lack indicia of reliability.‖). 
 We initially interpreted the Crawford decision to 
overrule Roberts only insofar as testimonial statements were 
concerned, but continued to apply the Confrontation Clause to 
nontestimonial hearsay through the Roberts indicia of 
reliability test.  See United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 
179 (3d Cir. 2005) (―[U]nless a particular hearsay statement 
qualifies as ‗testimonial,‘ Crawford is inapplicable and 
Roberts still controls.‖).  To date, we have yet to circumscribe 
the Confrontation Clause to its core concern with testimonial 
hearsay, but have rather maintained that ―nontestimonial 
statements do not violate the Confrontation Clause and are 
admissible as long as ‗they are subject to a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception or bear an adequate indicia of reliability.‘‖  
United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 77 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 134 (3d Cir. 2007)).  
To avoid needless confusion, we now expressly follow the 
Supreme Court‘s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as laid 
out in the trilogy of Davis, Whorton, and Bryant:  where 
nontestimonial hearsay is concerned, the Confrontation 
Clause has no role to play in determining the admissibility of 
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a declarant‘s statement.1  Accordingly, the ―indicia of 
reliability‖ test of Roberts is no longer an appropriate vehicle 
for challenging admission of nontestimonial hearsay.
2
 
                                              
1
 In light of intervening Supreme Court opinions, we 
are not bound by the cited panel decisions.  See Reich v. D.M. 
Savia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996) (―Although a 
panel of this court is bound by, and lacks authority to 
overrule, a published decision of a prior panel, . . . a panel 
may reevaluate a precedent in light of intervening authority 
. . . .‖).  Moreover, Jimenez and Albrecht failed to cite the 
recently issued Supreme Court decisions that we now 
conclude govern the present case, and ―[w]hile we strive to 
maintain a consistent body of jurisprudence, we also 
recognize the overriding principle that ‗[a]s an inferior court 
in the federal hierarchy, we are, of course, compelled to apply 
the law announced by the Supreme Court as we find it on the 
date of our decision.‘‖  United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 
541 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. City of 
Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 192 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980)).  Thus, 
we ―‗should not countenance the continued application in this 
circuit of a rule . . . which is patently inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court‘s pronouncements.‘‖  Id. (quoting Cox v. 
Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 620, 627 (3d Cir. 1975)). 
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 Thus, our Confrontation Clause inquiry is twofold.  
First, a court should determine whether the contested 
                                                                                                     
2
 To say that Roberts is no longer applicable means, as 
a practical matter, that a challenge to the admission of 
nontestimonial hearsay previously within the scope of the 
Confrontation Clause has no constitutional foundation.  For 
purposes of appellate review, this will require the application 
of a different standard of harmless error.  See United States v. 
Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 264 (3d Cir. 2009).  However, it should 
not detract in any way from the scrutiny that nontestimonial 
hearsay receives under the rules of evidence.  As the Roberts 
Court observed, ―hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause 
are generally designed to protect similar values, and stem 
from the same roots.‖  448 U.S. at 66 (internal marks and 
citations omitted).  As admissibility under Roberts relied in 
part on the existence of a relevant ―firmly rooted hearsay 
exception,‖ it will often be the case that evidence courts 
would deem inadmissible under Roberts is also inadmissible 
under the rules of evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2005) (determining 
admissibility under Bruton based on satisfaction of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)). 
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statement
3
 by an out-of-court declarant qualifies as 
testimonial under Davis and its progeny.  Second, the court 
should apply the appropriate safeguard.  If the absent 
witness‘s statement is testimonial, then the Confrontation 
Clause requires ―unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.‖  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  If the 
statement is nontestimonial, then admissibility is governed 
solely by the rules of evidence.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 823. 
 Applying this two-part test to the Title III recording at 
issue here, we have little hesitation in concluding that the 
recorded conversation was not testimonial, and thus not 
subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny.  Although we lack 
an authoritative definition of ―testimonial,‖ in Hendricks, 395 
F.3d at 180-81, we addressed the admissibility of similar Title 
III recordings of conversations between various nontestifying 
defendants and third parties.  After comparing these 
recordings to the examples which the Supreme Court stated 
were definitively testimonial, such as ―prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, 
and police interrogations,‖ we reasoned that a ―surreptitious‖ 
Title III recording neither qualified as ―ex parte in-court 
                                              
3
 In scrutinizing a contested statement, we note that a 
trial court should consider not only whether the statement as a 
whole qualifies as testimonial, but also whether portions of 
the statement may qualify as testimonial, and therefore 
require redaction of otherwise admissible evidence.  See 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006) (scrutinizing 
portions of contested statement separately to determine 
testimonial nature). 
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testimony or its functional equivalent,‖ nor formalized 
―extrajudicial statements.‖  Id.  Cognizant that ―a witness 
‗who makes a formal statement to government officers bears 
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark 
to an acquaintance does not,‘‖ id. (quoting Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 51), we concluded that ―the surreptitiously monitored 
conversations and statements contained in the Title III 
recordings [we]re not ‗testimonial‘ for purposes of 
Crawford.‖ 4  Id. 
It is likewise clear that, in the present case, the 
contested statements bear none of the characteristics exhibited 
by testimonial statements.  There is no indication that Berrios 
                                              
4
 Intervening Supreme Court cases have exclusively 
addressed which ―interrogations by law enforcement officers 
fall squarely within [the] class of testimonial hearsay,‖ 
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011) (quoting 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 826), and have done nothing to sway us 
from this understanding.  In Davis, the Court considered 
whether statements about domestic violence to law 
enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene 
qualified as testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, 
547 U.S. at 823, 829-30, and Bryant differed only insofar as 
the contested statements concerned a nondomestic dispute.  
131 S. Ct. at 1156.  The Bryant and Davis Courts held that 
statements for which ―the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution‖ are testimonial, but 
those made to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency 
are not.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
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and Moore held the objective of incriminating any of the 
defendants at trial when their prison yard conversation was 
recorded; there is no indication that they were aware of being 
overheard; and there is no indication that their conversation 
consisted of anything but ―casual remark[s] to an 
acquaintance.‖  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  Nor do we think 
that a surreptitious recording falls within the category of 
―abuses‖ which, historically, the Framers were concerned 
about eradicating from the government‘s investigative 
practices.  See id.  Consequently, we reject any suggestion 
that, in this circumstance, the Title III recording was 
testimonial,
5
 and therefore that the Confrontation Clause 
                                              
5
 Of course, it is possible that participants in a recorded 
conversation might be aware that they are being recorded, and 
intentionally incriminate another individual.  By no means are 
we establishing a categorical rule: simply because we have 
found some Title III recordings to be nontestimonial does not 
mean that no Title III recordings can qualify as such.  Rather, 
each statement should be scrutinized on its own terms to 
determine whether it exhibits the characteristics of a 
testimonial statement.  See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156 (―To 
determine whether the ‗primary purpose‘ of an interrogation 
is ‗to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency,‘ which would render resulting statements 
nontestimonial, we objectively evaluate the circumstances in 
which the encounter occurs and the statements and actions of 
the parties.‖ (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822)).  There may be 
some instances, such as where the primary purpose of the 
declarant‘s interlocutor was to elicit a testimonial statement, 
such that even if the declarant‘s purpose was innocent, the 
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affords protection against the introduction of such evidence at 
the defendants‘ trial. 
 Our conclusion that the contested statements were 
nontestimonial under Davis compels us to reject the 
challenges levied by Rodriguez and Cruz under Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).  In Bruton, the Court held 
that the Confrontation Clause bars the use of the confession 
of a nontestifying criminal defendant in a joint trial to the 
extent that it directly inculpates a co-defendant, though it 
might be otherwise admissible against the confessing 
defendant.  Id. at 126.  ―We have interpreted Bruton 
expansively, holding that it applies not only to custodial 
confessions, but also when the statements of the non-
testifying co-defendant were made to family or friends, and 
are otherwise inadmissible hearsay.‖  United States v. 
Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Monachelli 
v. Graterford, 884 F.2d 749, 753 (3d Cir. 1989), and United 
States v. Ruff, 717 F.2d 855, 857-58 (3d Cir. 1983)).  
However, because Bruton is no more than a by-product of the 
Confrontation Clause, the Court‘s holdings in Davis and 
Crawford likewise limit Bruton to testimonial statements.  
See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1017 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (holding that alleged Bruton claim did not violate 
the Confrontation Clause because the statements were not 
testimonial).  Any protection provided by Bruton is therefore 
only afforded to the same extent as the Confrontation Clause, 
which requires that the challenged statement qualify as 
                                                                                                     
conversation as a whole would be testimonial.  Nevertheless, 
we are not presented with such a situation here. 
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testimonial.  To the extent that we have held otherwise, we no 
longer follow those holdings.  See Monachelli, 884 F.2d at 
753 (holding that Bruton applies to statements ―made in a 
non-custodial setting to family and friends‖); Ruff, 717 F.2d 
at 857-58 (same).  And because, as discussed above, we have 
found the Title III recordings not to constitute testimonial 
hearsay, Bruton provides no solace for Rodriguez or Cruz. 
2.  Challenges under the Federal Rules of Evidence 
 Following the two-step framework articulated above, 
having determined that the challenged recording is 
nontestimonial and therefore that the Confrontation Clause 
challenges are not viable, we move next to the admissibility 
of the Title III recording against Cruz and Rodriguez under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  We may affirm the District 
Court on any ground supported by the record.  Mussare, 405 
F.3d at 168. 
 Rodriguez contends that the Title III recording was 
inadmissible hearsay as to him, but we agree with the 
government that the recording was admissible under Rule 
804(b)(3) as a statement against penal interest.  Although we 
are sensitive to the possibility that self-serving incriminating 
statements uttered by a non-testifying co-defendant may be 
inherently untrustworthy, ―[w]here statements inculpate both 
the speaker and the defendant challenging their admission, the 
statements are admissible so long as they were ‗self-
inculpatory‘ and not simply self-serving attempts to deflect 
criminal liability.‖  Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. 
Moses, 148 F.3d 277, 281 (3d Cir. 1998)).  In Mussare, we 
considered the admission of similar braggadocio by a non-
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testifying codefendant, who had boasted to a witness that he 
and the defendant had performed the illegal acts underlying 
the criminal charges.  Id.  We found that because the co-
defendant did not attempt to ―deflect liability,‖ but rather 
―took credit‖ for it, the statements were not inadmissible 
hearsay.  Id.
6
 
 Mussare squarely governs here.  In the Title III 
recording, Berrios and Moore unequivocally incriminate 
themselves in the carjackings and the Wendy‘s murder.  
Rather than attempting to ―deflect liability‖ to Rodriguez, 
they take full credit for the Wendy‘s murder, bragging about 
shooting the security guard, and mentioning Rodriguez only 
to complain that he crashed the getaway car.  In no way was 
the recorded conversation ―self-serving,‖ and therefore we 
will uphold the District Court‘s ruling as to its admissibility 
against Rodriguez. 
 Cruz‘s challenge is equally straightforward because 
Berrios and Moore never blame Cruz for any criminal 
conduct, or even mention him by name.  Moreover, Moore‘s 
threat to kill a man who worked with his girlfriend, and who 
was evidently talking to the police, did not clearly refer to 
Cruz, as Cruz himself concedes (and the government never 
attempted to argue that it did).  Thus, Cruz cannot contend 
that Berrios or Moore attempted to deflect any criminal 
liability in his direction during their conversation.  See 
                                              
6
 In Mussare, 405 F.3d at 168-69, we went on to 
determine admissibility under Bruton, which, as discussed in 
the preceding section, is no longer applicable in this situation. 
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Mussare, 405 F.3d at 168.  Rather, the challenged statements 
are entirely self-inculpatory, and consequently admissible 
against Cruz under Rule 804(b)(3).  See id. 
3.  Sufficiency of the Title III Application 
 Moore offers a curious argument that the Title III 
application submitted by the investigating prosecutor was 
facially deficient because the prosecutor was not admitted to 
practice in Puerto Rico, the jurisdiction where the warrant 
was obtained.  We find that this argument was waived under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12. 
 ―[U]nder Rule 12, a suppression argument raised for 
the first time on appeal is waived (i.e., completely barred) 
absent good cause,‖ including when the defendant filed a 
suppression motion but failed to include the specific issues 
raised on appeal.  United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 177, 
182 (3d Cir. 2008).  Rose concerned evidence which the 
defendant sought to suppress under the Fourth Amendment 
on the grounds that the warrant was facially deficient, id. at 
176-77, but in light of the expansive language of Rule 
12(b)(3)(C), which applies broadly to ―a motion to suppress,‖ 
we find it equally appropriate to apply this waiver rule in the 
Title III context.  See, e.g., United States v. Kincaide, 145 
F.3d 771, 778 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that failure to seek 
suppression of Title III wiretap evidence waived claim on 
appeal under Rule 12); United States v. Torres, 908 F.2d 
1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990) (same).  Thus, although Moore 
submitted a pre-trial motion to suppress the wiretap evidence, 
that motion preserved only those arguments which he 
specifically raised, and he did not raise this purported 
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deficiency.  Nor can Moore offer any argument as to why he 
was unable to make a proper motion, or contend that he was 
unaware of this potential basis for suppression, as would 
warrant a waiver exception under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a):  
his co-defendant, Berrios, moved for a new trial based on the 
purported deficiency in the Title III application, which Moore 
did not join.  The argument was accordingly waived under 
Rule 12, and because the plain error doctrine is inapplicable, 
see Rose, 538 F.3d at 177, we do not reach its dubious merits. 
B.  Other Acts Evidence 
 Berrios challenges the government‘s introduction at 
trial of statements he made in response to police questioning 
regarding loose ammunition in his home, as well as 
photographs of the ammunition, under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b).  We review the admission of evidence 
under Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001).  The government 
contends that this evidence demonstrated consciousness of 
guilt as part of a pattern of exculpatory statements he made to 
the police during the investigation of the Wendy‘s shooting.  
We disagree, but the error was harmless. 
1.  Admissibility under Rule 404(b) 
 Extrinsic bad acts evidence may not be introduced ―to 
prove a person‘s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with that 
character.‖  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  Berrios correctly observes 
that his unlawful possession of ammunition constitutes such a 
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bad act, and contends that the government introduced it for 
the improper purpose of showing his violent tendencies. 
 We have acknowledged that false exculpatory 
statements may be introduced as evidence of the defendant‘s 
consciousness of guilt of the underlying charges, even where 
such conduct may itself violate the law.  See United States v. 
Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 296 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Levy, 865 F.2d 551, 558 (3d Cir. 1989).  For example, in 
Kemp, we rejected a Rule 404(b) challenge to the use of false 
grand jury testimony, which the government used to disprove 
the defendant‘s ―alibi‖ that he was, in essence, too wealthy to 
have committed the charged money laundering offenses.  500 
F.3d at 296-97.  Despite the defendant‘s contention that the 
government was attempting to show that he was lying on the 
stand because he had lied in the grand jury, we found that, as 
a false exculpatory statement, this evidence properly 
demonstrated consciousness of guilt.  Id.  Similarly, in Levy, 
we found that a defendant‘s attempt to conceal his or her 
identity after committing a crime was admissible to show 
consciousness of guilt, even where the defendant‘s use of 
false identities may have violated ―international travelling 
statutes.‖  Levy, 865 F.2d at 558. 
 The government hangs its hat on the contention that 
Berrios‘s statements qualify under the consciousness of guilt 
exception to Rule 404(b) because they are, generally 
speaking, exculpatory, and were made during the 
investigation of the Wendy‘s shooting.  Thus, the government 
calls this part of a ―pattern‖ of false exculpatory statements, 
the entirety of which is relevant to show consciousness of 
guilt.  We disagree.  Although the statements concerned a 
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collection of unused ammunition which garnered attention 
during an investigation of the charged offenses, the 
connection between this statement and consciousness of guilt 
is simply too attenuated.  In both Kemp and Levy, the false 
exculpatory statements were directly related to the charged 
offense, thereby falling squarely within the kind of conduct 
traditionally demonstrating consciousness of guilt.  However, 
neither Levy nor Kemp suggests that a false exculpatory 
statement made to deflect criminal liability for unrelated 
conduct may also be introduced for such purposes, and we 
decline to hold so here.  Indeed, such an expansive 
interpretation of the consciousness of guilt exception would 
effectively eviscerate the rule itself:  any time that the 
government sought to introduce other bad acts evidence, it 
could circumvent Rule 404(b) by admitting the defendant‘s 
false exculpatory statements about that conduct. 
 We have said that ―[t]o show a proper purpose, the 
government must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into 
a chain of logical inferences without adverting to a mere 
propensity to commit crime now based on the commission of 
crime then.‖  Kemp, 500 F.3d at 296 (internal quotations 
omitted).  The government has failed to do so, and therefore, 
as the District Court recognized in its post-trial opinion, the 
evidence should have been excluded under Rule 404(b). 
2.  Harmless Error 
 Nevertheless, the District Court correctly concluded 
that the purported error was harmless because ―the jury 
learned that no similar ammunition was found at Wendy‘s‖ 
and the ―alleged falsehood was cumulative to other false and 
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contradictory statements that Berrios made during the same 
interrogation that bore directly on his consciousness of guilt 
concerning the Wendy‘s incident.‖  Where evidence is 
improperly admitted, reversal is not required where it is 
―highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment.‖  United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 326 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted).  ―Under the highly 
probable standard, . . . there is no need to disprove every 
reasonable possibility of prejudice,‖ and ―we can affirm for 
any reason supported by the record.‖  Id. (internal marks and 
quotations omitted).  In the present case, we may comfortably 
conclude that the harmless error standard is satisfied. 
 First and foremost, the evidence against Berrios was so 
overwhelming that any improper inferences the jury might 
have drawn from the ammunition evidence were marginal, at 
most.  See id.  Second, the jury learned that none of the 
ammunition found at Berrios‘s home resembled the 
ammunition found at the Wendy‘s, so would not likely have 
conflated the two.  Third, minimal prejudice would have 
resulted from the jury‘s consideration of the ammunition 
evidence in light of the court‘s instructions not to base its 
verdict on any uncharged acts and, as is oft repeated, ―juries 
are presumed to follow their instructions.‖  Id. (quoting Zafiro 
v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993)).  And fourth, the 
government presented other statements from the same 
conversation which properly demonstrated consciousness of 
guilt of the charged offense, so any inference that the jury 
might have improperly drawn from this evidence was 
cumulative of the balance of other consciousness of guilt 
 25 
evidence.  See id.  Thus, the District Court was correct in 
determining that a new trial was not warranted on this basis. 
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 Cruz, Rodriguez and Moore renew their sufficiency of 
the evidence challenges previously made in post-trial 
motions.  We exercise plenary review over a district court‘s 
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  United States v. Starnes, 583 
F.3d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  The verdict must be sustained 
if ―any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available evidence.‖  
United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1002 (3d Cir. 2008).  
We review for plain error where the defendant failed to make 
a timely motion for judgment of acquittal.  United States v. 
Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005).  Making all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the government as the 
verdict winner, Starnes, 583 F.3d at 206, we find these 
challenges meritless. 
1.  Cruz 
 Cruz submits that the government failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was one of the perpetrators 
of the charged crimes.  Cruz moved for judgment of acquittal 
at the close of trial under Rule 29.  The District Court 
correctly denied the motion as to Cruz‘s involvement in all 
but the Caines carjacking because, based on physical 
evidence, witness testimony, and post-offense conduct, a 
reasonable jury could have found him to be a participant in 
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the robbery, shooting and carjackings beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Silveus, 542 F.3d at 1002. 
 First, Cruz was tied to the crimes through fibers found 
in the Chevy Cavalier which matched a dark blue Nike jacket 
recovered from his room.  The government‘s expert testified 
that it was ―very unlikely‖ that fibers consistent with a 
garment would not originate from that garment, particularly 
given the ―over 80 billion tons of fibers produced each year.‖  
Additionally, the jury could reasonably infer that the jacket 
belonged to Cruz because, when told to dress, he put on pants 
from the room where the jacket was found.  Second, 
witnesses placed Cruz in the company of the other 
conspirators shortly before the attempted robbery.  Angel 
Ayala testified that at around 7 p.m., Cruz and Rodriguez had 
talked with him about holding a gun and that they were 
wearing black and blue sweaters with blue hoods.  Tyiasha 
Moore likewise testified that Rodriguez, Cruz and Berrios 
were gathered around a gun, all wearing dark clothing, one 
floor away from Moore, at around 10:15 p.m. that night.  And 
third, Armando Cruz, a government witness, confronted Cruz 
several times about the Wendy‘s shooting.  Cruz never denied 
his involvement in the crime until the third conversation, at 
which point Armando believed he had grown suspicious 
about Armando‘s assistance in the investigation.  Making all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the government as the 
verdict winner, Starnes, 583 F.3d at 206, Cruz cannot show 
that no reasonable jury could have convicted him on the 
totality of the evidence. 
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2.  Rodriguez 
 Rodriguez contends that the evidence was insufficient 
as a matter of law to convict him of the charges.  However, 
the tape of Berrios and Moore identifying Rodriguez as the 
getaway driver for the Wendy‘s robbery and as an accomplice 
in the carjackings was properly admitted, and he rightly 
concedes that if the recording was admissible against him, the 
evidence was sufficient for a conviction.  Rodriguez also 
argues that a jury could not find him guilty of attempting to 
carjack Peterson‘s car because none of the defendants harmed 
her in any way after she threw her keys into her yard.  
However, the specific intent element of carjacking is assessed 
at the time the defendant ―demanded or took control over the 
car.‖  See Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).  
Therefore, the fact that Peterson was not harmed does not 
negate the jury‘s assessment of Rodriguez‘s intent at the time 
the carjackers demanded the keys.  Indeed, Peterson testified 
that they ran away when neighborhood dogs began to bark, 
which suggests that the defendants may very well have 
changed their minds during the carjacking.  Drawing all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, Rodriguez 
cannot prevail merely because the victim escaped unharmed. 
3.  Moore 
 Moore argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove that he was an accomplice in the Wendy‘s robbery and 
carjackings, but concedes that if the recording of his 
conversation with Berrios was properly admitted, his 
sufficiency of the evidence argument must fail.  We reject his 
challenge accordingly. 
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D.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 Several of the defendants have appealed on the 
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct.  Cruz submits that the 
prosecution improperly vouched for a government witness, 
and, along with Rodriguez and Moore, contends that 
prosecutorial conduct during closing requires reversal. 
1.  Vouching 
 Cruz argues that Detective Matthews vouched for 
witnesses Tyiasha Moore and Angel Ayala by testifying that 
their grand jury testimony was consistent with their prior 
statements, and by confirming that he told them to tell the 
truth at the grand jury proceeding.  We review an unpreserved 
vouching claim for plain error.  See United States v. Harris, 
471 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2006).  If petitioner preserved the 
claim, we review for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 325 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 ―Vouching constitutes an assurance by the prosecuting 
attorney of the credibility of a Government witness through 
personal knowledge or by other information outside of the 
testimony before the jury.‖  United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 
180, 184 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).  Such conduct 
threatens to ―convey the impression that evidence not 
presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports 
the charges against the defendant,‖ thereby ―jeopardiz[ing] 
the defendant‘s right to be tried solely on the basis of the 
evidence presented to the jury,‖ and ―induc[ing] the jury to 
trust the Government‘s judgment rather than its own view of 
the evidence.‖  Id.  For a prosecutor‘s conduct to constitute 
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vouching, (1) ―the prosecutor must assure the jury that the 
testimony of a Government witness is credible,‖ and (2) ―this 
assurance [must be] based on either the prosecutor's personal 
knowledge, or other information not contained in the record.‖  
Id. at 187. 
 The government is not immunized from this attack 
merely because the challenged vouching occurred through the 
use of witness testimony.  Although ―vouching most often 
occurs during summation, . . . [it] may occur at any point 
during trial,‖ including witness examination, when the 
elicited testimony satisfies the two criteria for vouching.  
Vitillo, 490 F.3d at 328.  In Vitillo, for example, prosecutors 
referred to their presence at the defendant‘s interview by 
using the pronoun ―we‖ when examining a government agent 
about what the defendant had admitted to the government.  Id. 
at 329.  We concluded that, through their questions, the 
prosecutors effectively ―assured the jury that [the witness‘s] 
testimony was credible based on their personal observations 
of [his] interrogation of [the defendant].‖  Id.  As such, it 
constituted improper vouching.  Id. 
 In this case, however, the concerns underlying the 
vouching prohibition were not implicated by the examination 
of Detective Matthews.  Although the government elicited 
Matthews‘s testimony to assure the jury that Tyiasha Moore 
and Angel Ayala were credible, it did not do so based on 
information outside of the record.  Moreover, the jury could 
not glean anything about the prosecutor‘s personal knowledge 
of the grand jury proceedings.  Thus, at no point did the 
prosecutor imply that the jury should disregard the evidence 
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in favor of the government‘s undisclosed knowledge or 
judgment.  See Walker, 155 F.3d at 184. 
 Moreover, where the purported vouching is a 
―reasonable response to allegations of [impropriety]‖ by the 
defense, it is not improper.  United States v. Weatherly, 525 
F.3d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 2008); see also United States v. 
Gentles, 619 F.3d 75, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2010).  For instance, in 
Weatherly, we allowed the prosecutor a ―brief and appropriate 
response‖ during closing to the defense‘s ―speculation and 
attacks on the credibility of government witnesses.‖  Id.  The 
examination of Detective Matthews was also such a response.  
The defense had elicited testimony that Moore had testified at 
the grand jury under coercive conditions.  It was eminently 
appropriate for the prosecution to respond by introducing 
testimony to rehabilitate.  Cf. United States v. Harris, 471 
F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2006).  We reject Cruz‘s argument 
accordingly. 
2.  Closing Argument 
 Cruz, Moore and Rodriguez also challenge the fairness 
of the trial on the grounds that prosecutorial misconduct 
during closing jeopardized their right to a fair trial.  The 
alleged misconduct includes the reading of a poem 
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commemorating the victim, Officer Chapman,
7
 as well as the 
use of an enlarged photograph of the victim and brief 
references to Rodriguez‘s presence in jail.  We review a 
district court‘s rulings on contemporaneous objections to 
closing arguments for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 210 (3d Cir. 2005).  Any non-
contemporaneous objections are reviewed for plain error.  
United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 193 (3d Cir. 2010).  A 
nonconstitutional error ―requires reversal unless the error is 
harmless.‖  Id. at 194. 
 We agree that the closing was rife with misconduct, 
and to a degree that should not be tolerated by a district court.  
The reading of a commemorative poem could truly serve no 
purpose other than to appeal to the emotions and sympathies 
of the jury, see Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247-48 
& n.3 (1943); a criminal trial may prove cathartic for a 
victim‘s friends and family, but the courtroom is not an 
appropriate forum for a memorial.  If, as the government 
                                              
7
 The poem read at trial consisted of the following:  
―To Officer Chapman, I bid you farewell, a man and a hero I 
never knew well.  Like those before him, he answered the 
call, out gunned and out flanked, he was destined to fall.  But 
the job he chose never promised long life, just respect from 
others whom he protected from strife.  He went without fear 
into that night.  Against crime and evil he fought the good 
fight.  On an April night he did all that he could.  He 
sacrificed his life to fight bad with good.  In the face of a gun 
he showed steely nerve, and he kept his promise to protect 
and to serve.‖ 
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contends, the poem merely reiterated evidence that had been 
elicited at trial, then the government can simply discuss that 
evidence with the jury.  The same goes for the puzzle of 
Officer Chapman‘s face, which the government submits was 
meant to show the jury how disparate pieces of evidence fit 
together.  Visual aids can often help in conveying difficult 
concepts to a jury, particularly in a factually complex case 
such as this.  See, e.g., United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 
963, 979 (3d Cir. 1985) (approving use of a chart to diagram 
relationships).  But if that were truly the sole purpose behind 
the puzzle imagery, there was no such conceivable purpose in 
using an enlarged photograph of the victim‘s face as the 
puzzle image.  Considered jointly with the poem, the purpose 
of the government‘s conduct is transparent and its 
justifications are not credible; such conduct should not have 
been allowed in court.
8
 
 Nevertheless, a ―‗criminal conviction is not to be 
lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor‘s [conduct] 
standing alone . . . .‘‖  Lee, 612 F.3d at 194 (quoting United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)).  Rather, ―we ‗must 
examine the prosecutor‘s offensive actions in context and in 
light of the entire trial, assessing the severity of the conduct, 
the effect of the curative instructions, and the quantum of 
evidence against the defendant[s].‘‖  Id. (quoting Moore v. 
                                              
8
 The Government also concedes that the references to 
Rodriguez‘s presence in jail, both in mentioning his shackles 
and his prison letters to his girlfriend, were error.  However, 
because these were minor incidents, we focus our analysis on 
the more troubling instances of misconduct. 
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Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001)); United States v. 
Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2003).  ―A prosecutor‘s 
[conduct] can create reversible error if [it] ‗so infected the 
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 
denial of due process.‘‖  Lee, 612 F.3d at 194 (quoting 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). 
 In the present case, when examined in context and in 
light of the entire trial, the prosecutor‘s conduct does not 
merit reversal.  First, the objectionable poem was a mere ten 
lines out of over seventy-five pages of closing argument by 
the prosecution and thousands of pages of trial transcript; we 
have found prejudice to be minimal from similarly brief 
comments.  See Gambone, 314 F.3d at 180 (finding no 
prejudice where comments took up less than half a page out 
of 3200 pages of trial transcript); United States v. Zehrbach, 
47 F.3d 1252, 1267 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding no prejudice 
where comments were two sentences in a forty-page closing 
argument).  The same applies to the photograph of Officer 
Chapman, which had already been presented as evidence to 
the jury in its original form and, in the context of the entire 
trial, was displayed during an equally brief period of time.
9
  
Second, instructions by the judge, though not issued directly 
in response to the poem, sufficiently removed any lingering 
prejudice.  See United States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 789 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (finding opening and closing jury instructions to 
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 The government conceded at oral argument that its 
stance on this issue might be different if the photograph and 
poem were presented simultaneously, but because that was 
not the case, we see no need to address that possibility. 
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consider only the evidence, which did not include argument 
by counsel, sufficient, even without issuing an express 
curative instruction for the challenged comment); Gambone, 
314 F.3d at 180 (same).  As in Wood, the judge in this case 
instructed the jury repeatedly to base its judgment on the 
evidence, not on sympathy or bias,
10
 and that arguments by 
counsel do not constitute evidence.  These instructions were 
likewise an adequate response to the possibility that the 
improper commentary would lead the jury astray in its 
deliberations.  Moreover, the jury was already aware of the 
nature of the crime and the identity of the victim, and 
therefore would have been exposed to the passion and 
sympathy elicited by the poem throughout the trial.  See 
Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 795 (10th Cir. 1998).  
Finally, the jury was presented with ample evidence on which 
it could convict the defendants, see Wood, 486 F.3d at 789, 
and, as the District Court noted, the poem itself was 
―interlaced‖ with evidence adduced at trial.  See Gambone, 
314 F.3d at 179 (reaffirming prior holdings ―that probative 
evidence on the same issue as improper remarks may mitigate 
                                              
10
 Specifically, the District Court instructed the jury 
that it was ―to perform [its] duties without sympathy, without 
bias, and without prejudice to any party,‖ because ―[o]ur 
system of law does not permit jurors to be governed or 
affected by bias, sympathy or prejudice.‖  The District Court 
also emphasized that ―[u]nder no circumstances . . . should 
[the jury‘s] deliberations be affected or diverted by any 
appeals to bias, passion, or prejudice, nor influenced by any 
pity or sympathy in favor of either side.‖ 
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prejudice stemming from those remarks‖).  However 
prejudicial the photo and poem may seem in isolation, when 
viewed in context of the entire trial, prejudice was minimal 
and reversal is not warranted. 
E.  Jury Instructions 
In its charge on the specific intent element of 
carjacking,
11
 the District Court instructed the jury that 
―whether the Defendant ‗intended  to cause death or serious 
bodily harm‘ is to be judged objectively from the conduct of 
the Defendant as disclosed by the evidence, and from what 
one in the position of the alleged victim might reasonably 
conclude.‖  Berrios contends that by emphasizing the 
perspective of the victim, these instructions established a 
subjective standard allowing the jury to find the intent 
element satisfied based only on an ―empty threat‖ or 
―intimidating bluff,‖ thereby ―render[ing] superfluous the 
statute‘s ‗by force and violence or intimidation‘ element.‖  
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 11 (1999).  We 
                                              
11
 The four elements of carjacking, as instructed by the 
District Court, were:  (1) ―That the Defendant took a motor 
vehicle from the person or presence of another‖; (2) ―That the 
Defendant did so by force or violence, or by intimidation‖; 
(3) ―That the motor vehicle previously had been transported, 
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce‖; and 
(4) ―That the Defendant intended to cause death or serious 
bodily harm when the Defendant took the vehicle.‖  This 
accords with circuit practice.  See United States v. 
Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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exercise plenary review in determining ―whether the jury 
instructions stated the proper legal standard.‖  United States v. 
Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  
We review the particular wording of the instructions for abuse 
of discretion.  Id. (citation omitted).  Although an ―an empty 
threat, or intimidating bluff . . . is not enough to satisfy 
[carjacking‘s] specific intent element,‖ Holloway, 526 U.S. at 
11, when read in the context of the charge as a whole, the jury 
instructions were proper. 
Jury instructions ―‗may not be evaluated in artificial 
isolation,‘‖ but rather ―‗must be evaluated in the context of 
the overall charge.‘‖  United States v. Williams, 344 F.3d 365, 
377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Goldblatt, 813 
F.2d 619, 623 (3d Cir. 1987)).  Thus, an instruction that 
appears erroneous on its own may be remedied by the balance 
of the court‘s instructions.  See id.  In Williams, for example, 
the defendant contested the use of the word ―emboldening‖ in 
jury instructions on the ―carry‖ and ―possession‖ prongs of a 
§ 924(c) violation.  Id.  We found no error, because the stray 
term was ―included as part of a thorough instruction that 
sufficiently tracked language used by the Supreme Court.‖  
Id. at 377-78.  Likewise, in United States v. Khorozian, 333 
F.3d 498, 508 (3d Cir. 2003), we rejected the defendant‘s 
contention that an intent instruction for bank fraud 
―emasculated‖ the specific intent requirement.  Although the 
challenged statement, ―taken out of context,‖ did ―not employ 
the exact language‖ from our established definition of intent, 
the instruction as a whole ―communicate[ed] to the jury that it 
must find that [the defendant] possessed the specific intent to 
defraud . . . .‖  Id. 
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At the outset, of course, it is apparent that the 
challenged clause did not set forth a ―subjective standard,‖ as 
Berrios contends, but rather an objective reasonable person 
standard.  Objective standards are often defined as what a 
reasonable person under the circumstances would believe or 
understand.  See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 
2394, 2402 (2011) (―By limiting analysis to the objective 
circumstances of the interrogation, and asking how a 
reasonable person in the suspect‘s position would understand 
his freedom . . . to leave, the objective test [for custody under 
Miranda] avoids burdening police with the task of 
anticipating the idiosyncrasies of every individual suspect and 
divining how those particular traits affect each person‘s 
subjective state of mind.‖); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (holding that ―seizure‖ for Fourth 
Amendment purposes objectively occurs when ―in view of all 
of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable 
person would have believed that he was not free to leave‖).  
And despite Berrios‘s contentions otherwise, a ―reasonable 
person in the victim‘s position‖ standard is distinguishable 
from the victim‘s subjective belief:  even where a victim who 
is easily intimidated might be subjectively fearful, a jury 
employing this standard must discern whether a reasonable 
person in that position would find the defendant possessed the 
requisite intent. 
Even if a juror might mistake the challenged clause as 
a subjective standard, the instructions as a whole tracked the 
correct standard for specific intent.  We have said that a 
defendant‘s specific intent is to be judged ―[b]ased upon the 
totality of all the surrounding facts and circumstances,‖ 
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United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478, 485 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(applying specific intent standard for carjacking) (emphasis 
added); see Polsky v. Patton, 890 F.2d 647, 650 (3d Cir. 
1989) (discussing intent standard for third degree murder), 
and not ―by the secret motive of the actor, or some 
undisclosed purpose merely to frighten, not to hurt.‖  United 
States v. Guilbert, 692 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(quoting Shaffer v. United States, 308 F.2d 654, 655 (5th Cir. 
1962)).  The instructions here invited the jury to consider the 
facts in precisely this way:  ―objectively from the conduct of 
the Defendant as disclosed by the evidence, and from what 
one in the position of the alleged victim might reasonably 
conclude.‖  The clause which Berrios highlights, read in 
context, does no more than provide one of the evidentiary 
factors the jury could consider in reaching its verdict.  The 
fact that the clause appears in the second half of the sentence, 
connected by an ―and,‖ confirms its role as a descriptive 
example rather than a discrete instruction which contradicts 
the initial one.  See United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 
545 (3d Cir. 2003) (―[A] defect in a charge may result in legal 
error if the rest of the instruction contains language that 
merely contradicts and does not explain the defective 
language in the instruction.‖).  Thus, read as a whole, the 
instruction did not direct the jury to rely on the victim‘s 
subjective perception, and therefore, did not run the risk of 
allowing a conviction based on empty threats or bluffs. 
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F.  Double Jeopardy 
 Berrios was convicted under Virgin Islands law for 
first-degree (felony) murder, 14 V.I.C. § 922(a)(2),
12
 and 
under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1),
13
 both premised on 
the killing of Officer Chapman.  He was sentenced to 
consecutive terms of life imprisonment, which he challenges 
as a violation of the Fifth Amendment‘s Double Jeopardy 
                                              
12
 The text of § 922(a)(2), in relevant part, defines first 
degree murder as ―(a) All murder which . . . (2) is committed 
in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, burglary, 
kidnapping, rape, robbery or mayhem, assault in the first 
degree, assault in the second degree, assault in the third 
degree and larceny.‖ 
13
 The text of § 924(j)(1) provides, in relevant part:  ―A 
person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), 
causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm, 
shall--(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 
1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term 
of years or for life; and (2) if the killing is manslaughter (as 
defined in section 1112), be punished as provided in that 
section.‖ 
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Clause.
14
  Our review is plenary.  See United States v. Bishop, 
66 F.3d 569, 573 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 ―With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a 
single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than 
prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended.‖  Missouri v. 
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).  ―Where Congress 
intended . . . to impose multiple punishments, imposition of 
such sentences does not violate the Constitution.‖  Albernaz v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981).  Accordingly, a 
Double Jeopardy challenge must fail if the statutory text 
clearly reflects a legislative intent to impose multiple 
sentences on a defendant for a single underlying transaction.  
See id. at 344 & n.3; Bishop, 66 F.3d at 573-74.  If, after 
inspection, Congress‘s intent remains unclear, cumulative 
sentencing poses no double jeopardy problem only if ―each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not,‖ 
thereby satisfying Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 
(1932).  Bishop, 66 F.3d at 573 (quoting Blockburger, 284 
U.S. at 304).  However, ―[b]ecause the [Blockburger] rule 
‗serves as a means of discerning congressional purpose[, it] 
should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear 
indication of contrary legislative intent.‘‖  United States v. 
                                              
14
 ―The Virgin Islands and the federal government are 
considered one sovereignty for the purposes of determining 
whether an individual may be punished under both Virgin 
Islands and United States statutes for a similar offense 
growing out of the same occurrence.‖  Gov’t of the V.I. v. 
Braithwaite, 782 F.2d 399, 406 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 975-76 (3d Cir. 1994) (third alteration 
in original) (quoting Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340). 
 The parties agree that, because felony murder in the 
Virgin Islands is a lesser included offense of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(j), Blockburger is not satisfied.  The question we are 
faced with is whether, by expressly requiring a § 924(c) 
violation before imposing a § 924(j) penalty, Congress also 
intended § 924(j) to incorporate subsection (c)‘s consecutive 
sentence mandate, § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).  This is a question 
which has divided our sister circuits.  Compare United States 
v. Dinwiddie, 618 F.3d 821, 837 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
consecutive sentence provision under § 924(c) applies to 
sentences imposed under § 924(j)), and United States v. 
Battle, 289 F.3d 661, 665-69 (10th Cir. 2002) (same), with 
United States v. Julian, 633 F.3d 1250, 1252-57 (11th Cir. 
2011) (holding that § 924(j) defines a distinct offense from 
§ 924(c) and is not subject to consecutive sentence mandate).  
We conclude that Congress did so intend, and will therefore 
deny Berrios‘s double jeopardy challenge. 
1.  The Statutory Scheme 
 As is customary in cases of statutory interpretation, 
―our inquiry begins with the language of the statute and 
focuses on Congress‘[s] intent.‖  United States v. Abbott, 574 
F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  ―Because statutory 
interpretation . . . is a holistic endeavor,‖ we do ―not look 
merely to a particular clause in which general words may be 
used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute.‖  
United States v. Cooper, 396 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(internal marks and quotations omitted). 
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 The text of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) reads as follows: 
―A person who, in the course of a 
violation of subsection (c), causes the 
death of a person through the use of a 
firearm, shall— 
 (1) if the killing is a murder (as 
defined in section 1111), be 
punished by death or by 
imprisonment for any term of 
years or for life, and 
 (2) if the killing is manslaughter 
(as defined in section 1112), be 
punished as provided in that 
section.‖ 
18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (emphasis added).  By virtue of the 
subsection (c) cross-reference, we will begin, counter-
intuitively, with § 924(c). 
 We have explored the mechanics of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
more fully elsewhere, see Abbott, 574 F.3d at 206-08; Bishop, 
66 F.3d at 573-75, but briefly revisit it here.  In its prefatory 
clause, subsection (c) begins by identifying a core set of 
predicate offenses,  crimes of violence and drug trafficking 
crimes, which fall within its scope.  See § 924(c)(1)(A).  The 
prefatory clause then provides that a defendant who commits 
a predicate offense while using, carrying or possessing a 
firearm, is subject to a mandatory punishment ―in addition to‖ 
the sentence for that predicate offense.  Id.  Subsection (c) 
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also makes clear that ―no term of imprisonment imposed on a 
person under . . . subsection [(c)] shall run concurrently with 
any other term of imprisonment imposed on the 
person . . . .‖15  § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (emphasis added) (the 
―consecutive sentence mandate‖).  The Supreme Court – 
along with every Court of Appeals to address the question, 
including our own – has unequivocally held that ―[w]hen a 
defendant violates § 924(c), his sentencing enhancement 
under that statute must run consecutively to all other prison 
terms.‖  United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1997) 
(emphasis added); see, e.g., Bishop, 66 F.3d at 574-75 
(―‗[T]he legislative intent to impose a consecutive sentence 
for the violation of section 924(c) is plain from the language 
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 Although the scope of § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) 
substantially overlaps with that of subsection (c)‘s prefatory 
clause, § 924(c)(1)(A), the consecutive sentence mandate 
applies to ―any other term of imprisonment imposed,‖ thereby 
reaching more broadly than the language of the prefatory 
clause, which only mandates the imposition of penalties in 
addition to the predicate offense.  In recognition of this, the 
government implicitly concedes that where, as here, Berrios 
challenges the § 924(j) sentence based on a conviction for 
felony murder which was not the charged predicate offense, 
only the consecutive sentence mandate is controlling.  
Nevertheless, we can see no reason for Congress to 
differentiate between the extension of the prefatory clause to 
subsection (j) and the extension of the consecutive sentence 
mandate, because both are essential to the sentencing scheme. 
 44 
of that provision . . . .‘‖ (quoting United States v. Mohammed, 
27 F.3d 815, 819-20 (2d Cir. 1994))). 
 The remainder of subsection (c) then provides a length 
for the additional mandatory sentence, the severity of which 
depends on factors delineated in that subsection or elsewhere.  
See Abbott, 574 F.3d at 206-08 (holding that mandatory 
minimum sentences provided in other provisions of law may 
apply to increase a subsection (c) punishment).  The 
provisions of subsection (c) provide for greater sentence 
lengths based upon, for example, actual discharge of the 
weapon, § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), or the use of a machinegun, 
§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii).  This structure extends to § 924 (j):  like 
the rest of subsection (c), § 924(j) simply provides an 
additional circumstance beyond the existence of the predicate 
offense – namely, where a subsection (c) violation results in 
the death of a person – that governs the length of a sentence 
to be imposed.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (varying sentence 
lengths depending on whether death results from murder or 
manslaughter).  Understood in the context of the statutory 
scheme, section 924(j) effectively functions as an extension 
of subsection (c)‘s statutory core.  And in light of the 
subsection (c) cross-reference, Congress‘s intent to treat it as 
such is clear.  With the statutory scheme firmly in mind, we 
turn to the double jeopardy issue. 
2.  The Consecutive Sentence Mandate 
 Berrios‘s principal argument is that § 924(j) lacks any 
indication that a sentence is to be stacked on top of his other 
offenses, and therefore the requisite congressional intent is 
not present.  He also observes that the consecutive sentence 
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mandate exclusively applies to a penalty ―imposed under‖ 
subsection (c), see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), and contends 
that a sentence imposed pursuant to a subsection (j) 
conviction is not ―imposed under‖ subsection (c) because, 
following the Eleventh Circuit‘s reasoning in Julian, 633 F.3d 
at 1252-57, subsection (j) constitutes a separate offense.  
Although the government concedes that § 924(j) establishes a 
discrete crime from § 924(c), this has no bearing on our 
decision:  we are persuaded that under any reasonable 
interpretation, 18 U.S.C.  924(j) is subject to the consecutive 
sentence mandate provided in § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). 
 First, in light of Congress‘s clear intent to stack 
punishments for all § 924(c) violations, we agree with the 
Tenth Circuit that ―[t]he failure to repeat the prohibition 
against concurrent sentences set forth in § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) 
does not demonstrate that Congress has determined that the 
penalty set forth in § 924(j) should not be imposed ‗in 
addition to‘‖ any other term of imprisonment.  Battle, 289 
F.3d at 668.  After all, the consecutive sentence mandate is 
the heart of the statutory scheme set forth by subsection (c); 
its veritable raison d’être.  See Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 9-10.  It 
takes no special insight or leap of logic to conclude that the 
central reason for Congress‘s choice of language in writing 
subsection (j) – ―during the course of a violation of 
subsection (c)‖ – was to ensure that separating out subsection 
(j) from subsection (c) did not deprive the law of a coherent 
sentencing scheme, the heart of which is the consecutive 
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sentence mandate.
16
  As we have said before, ―[o]nce 
Congress has clearly stated an intention to stack punishments 
as it did in section 924(c), ‗it need not reiterate that intent in 
any subsequent statutes that fall within the previously defined 
class.‘‖  Bishop, 66 F.3d at 575 (quoting United States v. 
Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419, 1428 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
To interpret the text any other way would give rise to 
an anomalous result:  that ―a defendant convicted under 
§ 924(c) is subject to an additional consecutive sentence only 
in situations that do not result in a death caused by use of a 
firearm.‖  Allen, 247 F.3d at 769; Battle, 289 F.3d at 668 
(quoting Allen, 247 F.3d at 769).  We agree with the Eighth 
and Tenth Circuits that it is highly ―unlikely that Congress, 
which clearly intended to impose additional cumulative 
punishments for using firearms during violent crimes in cases 
where no murder occurs, would turn around and not intend to 
impose cumulative punishments in cases where there are 
actual murder victims.‖  Battle, 289 F.3d at 668 (quoting 
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 We find unpersuasive the Eleventh Circuit‘s 
reasoning in Julian, 633 F.3d at 1255-56, that the contrary 
interpretation is necessary to avoid rendering superfluous the 
language of § 924(c)(5), because otherwise, ―no difference 
[would] exist[] between the sentences that these two 
provisions prescribe[].‖  In fact, there is a patently obvious 
difference: § 924(j) requires the death of a person ―through 
the use of a firearm,‖ (emphasis added), whereas § 924(c)(5) 
is based on the use, carrying, or possession of ―armor 
piercing ammunition,‖ (emphasis added), which is, of course, 
not a firearm. 
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Allen, 247 F.3d at 769).  In light of the statutory scheme and 
purpose shared by subsection (c) and subsection (j), we 
simply cannot impute a contradictory intent to Congress 
without some underlying rationale. 
This reading is supported by our prior interpretation of 
§ 924(c)‘s prefatory clause, which instructs that the penalties 
enumerated in subsection (c) apply ―in addition to the 
punishment provided‖ for the predicate crime of violence or 
drug trafficking offense, ―except to the extent that a greater 
minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection 
or by any other provision of law.‖  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) 
(emphasis added); see Abbott, 574 F.3d at 206-08.  As we 
discussed in Abbott, the prefatory clause‘s mandatory 
sentencing scheme is not limited to subsection (c), because 
―[i]n referring to alternative minimum sentences, the 
prefatory clause mentions ‗any other provision of law‘ to 
allow for additional § 924(c) sentences that may be codified 
elsewhere in the future . . . .‖  574 F.3d at 208 (emphasis 
added).  The clause thereby ―provides a safety valve that 
would preserve the applicability of any other provisions that 
could impose an even greater mandatory minimum 
consecutive sentence for a violation of § 924(c).‖  United 
States v. Studifin, 240 F.3d 415, 423 (4th Cir. 2001). 
Although Abbott did not place subsection (j) squarely 
before us at that time, we think that subsection (j) was the 
unambiguous target of this safety valve.  Accordingly, if 
Congress wanted to increase the mandatory minimum for a 
violation of subsection (c) resulting in the death of a person, it 
could do so in subsection (j) without rewriting the entire 
statute.  Cf. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 575.  Thus, Congress‘s intent 
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in imposing cumulative punishment on a defendant for both a 
§ 924(c) violation and a predicate offense was not constrained 
to those penalties provided solely by that subsection.  Rather, 
the consecutive sentence scheme is intended to impose 
additional punishments for any violation of subsection (c), 
whether the penalties for such violations are provided in that 
subsection or elsewhere. 
Second, we think that Berrios‘s interpretation of 
sentences ―imposed under‖ subsection (c) to exclude 
subsection (j) lacks a firm textual basis and is unduly 
restrictive in light of the statutory scheme.  Of course, 
―imposed under‖ could refer to only those sentences literally 
listed in subsection (c), but that is by no means the only 
possible definition.  For instance, Webster‘s defines ―under‖ 
as, in part, ―subject to regulation by,‖ see Webster‘s Third 
Int‘l Dictionary (1989), and so it is equally plausible that a 
sentence ―imposed under‖ subsection (c) means ―subject to 
regulation by‖ subsection (c), a definition under which 
subsection (j) would clearly qualify.  But in light of the 
statutory scheme as a whole, it is apparent that the phrase 
serves a functional – as opposed to literal – purpose, by 
identifying those sentences imposed as a consequence of a 
subsection (c) offense:  in other words, those sentences 
handed down for a subsection (c) violation. 
Although we decline to follow the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits in concluding that subsection (j) merely sets forth 
sentencing elements to be applied to a subsection (c) offense, 
see Battle, 289 F.3d at 666; Allen, 247 F.3d at 769, such a 
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determination is not dispositive.
17
  The sentencing scheme 
embodied by subsection (c) does not distinguish between an 
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 We acknowledge that our resolution of this issue 
would be more straightforward were we to follow the Eighth 
and Tenth Circuits in holding that § 924(j) merely provides an 
―enhancement‖ for a § 924(c) offense.  See Battle, 289 F.3d at 
666; Allen, 247 F.3d at 769.  Nevertheless, we are persuaded 
that such a reading would be inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court‘s analysis of § 924(c) enhancements and offenses in 
Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 124-31 (2000), and 
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 552-56 (2002), as well 
as Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 233-52 (1999) – 
cases which the Eighth and Tenth Circuits did not address. 
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In Castillo, the Court held that a then-current provision 
enhancing the mandatory minimum sentence for use of a 
machinegun during a § 924(c)(1) violation constituted an 
element of a separate crime rather than a sentencing factor.  
530 U.S. at 124-31.  The Court reasoned that the use of a 
machinegun reflected a ―great‖ variation, ―both in degree and 
in kind,‖ from a generic § 924(c) offense, and was unlike 
―traditional sentencing factors‖ relating to offender 
characteristics, such as recidivism.  Id. at 126.  The Court also 
acknowledged that ―treating facts that lead to an increase in 
the maximum sentence as a sentencing factor would give rise 
to significant constitutional questions.‖  Id. at 124 (citing 
Jones, 526 U.S. at 239-52).  Conversely, in Harris, 536 U.S. 
at 556, the Court held that the provisions of § 924(c) 
increasing the penalty for brandishing or discharging a 
firearm were sentencing factors, not elements.  Those 
provisions did ―not repeat the elements from the principal 
paragraph‖ setting forth the offense, raised the minimum 
sentences in incremental steps, and were premised on 
―paradigmatic sentencing factor[s].‖  Id. at 552-54. 
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These cases, in conjunction with Jones, 526 U.S. at 
251-52, where the Court held that ―death‖ constituted an 
element of an aggravated carjacking offense under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2119(3), guide us here.  We think that the death of a person 
– a fact more serious than the use of a machinegun in Castillo 
– introduces a ―great‖ variation in degree and in kind from 
other subsection (c) offenses, and cannot be considered a 
―traditional sentencing factor.‖  See 530 U.S. at 124; Jones, 
526 U.S. at 233, 243-44.  Additionally, just as the significant 
step up in the mandatory minimum for machinegun use – 25 
years – would have posed ―significant constitutional 
questions‖ if premised on a sentencing factor, Castillo, 530 
U.S. at 124, exposure to life imprisonment and the death 
penalty in § 924(j) would as well.  See Jones, 526 U.S. at 233, 
239-52.  In sum, these characteristics, in addition to locating § 
924(j) in a wholly separate subsection rather than integrating 
it into § 924(c), strongly suggest that Congress intended the 
death of a person to be considered an element of a discrete 
offense – an offense provided by § 924(j). 
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increased sentence provided as a function of a sentencing 
factor, as in § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), see Harris v. United States, 
536 U.S. 545, 552-54 (2002), or an element of a separate 
offense, as in § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), see Castillo v. United States, 
530 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2000).  Nor do we think that, where an 
offense is defined jointly by two statutory provisions, a 
sentence can only be ―imposed under‖ one of them.  Rather, 
we are persuaded that a subsection (j) sentence qualifies as a 
sentence ―imposed under‖ subsection (c), even though it is 
also ―imposed under‖ subsection (j), because they are part 
and parcel of the same statutory scheme, and jointly provide 
the legal basis for the sentence.  Simply put, because a § 
924(j) sentence is imposed on a defendant for violating 
subsection (c), such a sentence is ―imposed under‖ subsection 
(c).
18
 
                                                                                                     
Nevertheless, we do not think that this is the proper 
case to decide the question.  First, the government expressly 
stated at argument that it considered § 924(j) to constitute a 
separate offense and, consistent with this view, specifically 
charged a § 924(j) offense in Count Six of the indictment.  
Second, in its instructions to the jury, the District Court 
included the death of a person as an element of the § 924(j) 
offense, thereby obviating any possibility that the exposure to 
an increased maximum sentence compromised due process, 
which would be the central issue implicated by our decision.  
See Jones, 526 U.S. at 232. 
18
 This is also consistent with the indictment, which 
charged Berrios with a violation of § 924(c) along with a 
violation of § 924(j). 
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We find the Eleventh Circuit‘s reasoning to the 
contrary unpersuasive.  See Julian, 633 F.3d at 1253.  In 
concluding that a subsection (j) penalty is not ―imposed 
under‖ subsection (c) because subsection (j) ―provided 
[defendant‘s] sentence,‖ the Eleventh Circuit looked to 
―decisions of our sister circuits that have declined to read 
section 924(o), which punishes ‗conspir[acies] to commit an 
offense under subsection (c),‘ as requiring consecutive 
sentences.‖  Id.  But neither United States v. Clay, 579 F.3d 
919, 933 (8th Cir. 2009), nor United States v. Stubbs, 279 
F.3d 402, 405-09 (6th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds 
by United States v. Helton, 349 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir. 2003), 
the two cases on which Julian relies, are analogous.  In those 
cases, the defendant was charged and convicted of a § 924(o) 
offense, but sentenced under § 924(c), thereby posing a 
severe problem under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000).  See Stubbs, 279 F.3d at 408-09.  Here, on the other 
hand, as in Julian, the defendant was convicted and sentenced 
under the same provision, § 924(j), thereby implicating none 
of the concerns underlying those decisions.  Moreover, 
§ 924(o)‘s relationship to § 924(c) is easily distinguishable 
from that of § 924(j):  § 924(o) creates a conspiracy offense, 
which is by nature inchoate, and therefore does not require 
that the defendant actually commit the underlying crime.  See 
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975).  In that 
regard, a § 924(o) sentence, unlike § 924(j), is in no way 
dependent on a § 924(c) violation, and therefore provides no 
guidance for our analysis here. 
Based on our reading of the statutory scheme, we 
conclude that Congress intended a defendant who violates 
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subsection (c) to be subject to enhanced sentences by virtue 
of the consecutive sentence mandate.  A defendant who 
violates subsection (j) by definition violates subsection (c), 
and therefore is subject to the mandate, regardless of whether 
§ 924(j) constitutes a discrete criminal offense from § 924(c).  
And when Congress required proof of a § 924(c) violation 
before imposing the penalties listed under § 924(j), it 
intended to include a subsection (j) penalty within the scope 
of those sentences ―imposed under‖ subsection (c).  Finding 
that Congress clearly intended to impose cumulative 
punishment for a violation of subsection (j) and any other 
offense, see Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, we reject Berrios‘s 
double jeopardy challenge accordingly. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
judgments of conviction and sentence. 
